Monday, May 11, 2009

‘Animal spirits’ update, May 11, 2009

Even if the unemployment rate goes to 11.9 percent over the coming year, the “animal spirits” or confidence levels of Americans are forecast to improve.  The bottoming of confidence levels is also seen in the Michigan Consumer Sentiment series.

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Our yield-curve-plus-“animal spirits” recession forecasting model shows the recession coming to an end (keep in mind that this model has correctly predicted in real time the beginning and end of the last recession and the onset of this one, and performs similarly on every recession since 1957 in backtesting).  The “probability” of negative real growth continuing is nil by these lights.

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Note that the model does not foresee a “double dip” within the next 12 months, while it clearly signaled the 1982 relapse.  The very severity of the declines of many output variables makes it more likely that they will be able to find a bottom.

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More detail on the model is available here.

Discussion:  It is very common at the extreme points of economic and stock market cycles to assert that “it is different this time.”  The recession forecasting model is a single equation model with parameters estimated on data available before 1990, so for its parameters to change the world would in fact need to be very different in this cycle.  That is possible, and we shall soon have the answer.  What distinguishes this cycle is its global debt-deflationary aspect, which has exacerbated the downturn everywhere.  Countering this, however, is the stated and demonstrated willingness of monetary authorities to provide credit.  Commercial and industrial lending slowed after the last two recessions (as I showed here) as businesses and lenders alike become more risk averse.  Given the debt load on consumers, businesses and government, the recovery can be expected to be slow.  Much of the “real” GDP growth of this decade was financed by a huge and unsustainable run-up in consumer debt, so the country appears to be dropping back to a “pay-go” level of consumer spending (as they say within the Beltway) with some saving.

My personal opinion on the financial sector:  the lunatics are running the asylum in Washington.  Perhaps because he isn’t a financial person, President Obama brought on board the very actors who opened the Pandora’s box of deregulation, Larry Summers and Tim Geithner.  The greatest danger now is that the government throws more good taxpayer money after bad private debts; I subscribe to the IMF view that America is close to a tipping point of debt-deflationary implosion with respect to government spending.  It is better to do nothing than to bail out more banks.  There are plenty of healthy banks that can meet needs of business as recovery unfolds.  It is clear that the big money institutions control this administration, and the people are up in arms about throwing good money after bad, so Congress is letting it all happen under the table, through the Fed and the FDIC.  The problem with activist cries like Paul Krugman’s to clean up the mess is who would be doing the clean up.  Bad private debts need to charge off, not be added to the public debt at par or something close to it, and private investors need to take the hit.  It is these very same private investors who “own” Congress, however.

Long term, it is my surmise that the inequality of the income distribution will continue to cause “failures of effective demand” like the current one.  (See this.)  A disproportionate amount of money gets sucked out of the economy by the rich, who control the financial system, manipulate the markets, and tell the government what to do.  In a society in which personal assets are required for access to education and opportunity, the majority of the population can be kept in a pseudo-meritocratic servitude.  Already one third of American students do not complete high school, a characteristic of a feudal society or a banana republic.  Nothing President Obama is doing will reverse this, in my opinion; nor will anything less than a total breakdown and renegotiation of the social contract make fundamental change possible.  The rich have their hooks too far into the economy and the government for that to happen.  Hence I subscribe to the thesis of Strauss and Howe that we’re heading toward a national crisis in about ten years that will define a new America, with a new social contract.  The present one is broken.  (See here and here for background on Strauss and Howe’s historical long wave theory.)  In the meanwhile, over the next decade we can expect to see failures of effective demand like the one we’re in now, over and over again, until we reach the crisis point.

Wednesday, May 6, 2009

On the road

Next post will be the “animal spirits” update on Monday.

Here are some oldies but goodies in the meantime:

Bare knuckles crypto-capitalism

I hope this kind of thing stops soon.  It’s not helping.  More evidence of suboptimal thinking during a panic by those who seem to have forgotten that they are not above the rule of law (and isn’t that what bothered people about the last administration’s conduct?).  More evidence according to my working hypothesis of increasingly authoritarian rule during the decade before the big crack-up.  The simplest way to clean up the financial system would be to require full on-balance-sheet disclosure of assets and liabilities, and to cap financial institution size at a level significantly less than too-big-to-fail.  And of course, bring back Glass-Steagall.  (If all the derivative crap were disclosed, that in itself would go a long way to cleaning up the mess, with or without Glass-Steagall.)  But will Larry Summers allow us to do this?  Doubt it.  The elite get to keep their cake and eat it too.

Via: New York Times - As Investors Circle Ailing Banks, Fed Sets Limits – Vultures circling the banks, will Cool Hand Ben be able to ward them off?

Via: Independent Accountant – alleged [ignorant] criminality of Paulson and Bernanke

Ken Lewis, Whistleblower?

"[Fed] Chairman Ben Bernanke and then-Treasury Department chief Henry Paulson pressured Bank of America Corp. to not discuss its increasingly troubled plan to buy Merrill Lynch & Co.--a deal that later triggered a government bailout of BofA--according to testimony by Kenneth Lewis, the bank's chief executive. Mr. Lewis, testifying under oath before New York's attorney general in February, told prosecutors that he believed Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke were instructing him to keep silent about deepening difficulties at Merrill, the struggling brokerage giant. ... Under normal circumstances, banks must alert shareholders of any materially signifcant financial hits. ... Disclosing losses at Merrill--which eventually totaled $15.84 billion for the fourth quarter--could have given the BofA's shareholders an opportunity to stop the deal and let Merrill collapse instead. ... 'It wasn't up to me.' Mr. Lewis said. The BofA chief said he was told by Messrs Bernanke and Paulson that the deal needed to be completed, otherwise it would 'impose a big risk to the financial system' of the US as a whole. ... A person in government familiar with Mr. Bernanke's conversations with Mr. Lewis said Wednesday that the Fed chairman didn't offer Mr. Lewis advice on the question of disclosure. Instead, Mr. Bernanke suggested Mr. Lewis consult his own counsel. Mr. Paulson repeatedly told Mr. Lewis that 'the US government was committted to ensuring that no systematically important financial institution would fail.' ... In the transcript reviewed by the Journal, Mr. Lewis didn't say he was explicitly instructed to keep silent about the losses at Merrill. But his testimony indicates that he believed the govenment wanted him to remain silent. ... By keeping mum, the CEO of one of the biggest US banks appeared to set aside a basic tenet of American-style finance--that, above all, companies must disclose marterial informantion to shareholders and potential investors. 'Regulators are supposed to tell you to obey the law, not to disobey the law,' said Jonathan R. Macey, deputy dean of Yale Law School, 'If you're the CEO, your first obligation is not to your regulator, it's to your institution and shareholders", my emphasis, Liz Rappaport at the WSJ, 23 April 2009.

"The cavalier use of brute government force has become routine, but the emerging story of how Hank Paulson, and Ben Bernanke forced CEO Ken Lewis to blow up Bank of America is still shocking. It's a case study in the ways that panicky regulators have so often botched the bailout and made the financial crisis worse. ... In order to keep Mr. Lewis quiet, they all but ordered him to deceive his own shareholders. And in the name of restoring financial confidence, they have so mistreated [BofA] that bank executives everywhere have concluded that neither the Treasury nor the [Fed] can be trusted. ... But Washington decided that America's financial system couldn't withstand a Merrill failure, and that BofA hasd to risk its own solvency to save it. So then-Treasury Secretary Paulson, who says he was acting at the dcirection of [Fed] Chairman Bernanke, told Mr. Lewis that the feds would fire him and his board if they didn't complete the deal. ... But since the government didn't want to reveal this new federal investment [TARP] until after the merger closed, Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke rejected Mr. Lewis request to get their commitmnent in writing. 'We do not want a disclosable event,' Mr. Lewis says Mr. Paulson told him. 'We do not want a public disclosure.' Imagine what would happen to a CEO who said that. ... The merger closed on January 1. But investors and taxpayers had to wait weeks to learn that the government had invested another $20 billion plus loan insurance in BofA, and that Merrill had lost a staggering $15 billion in the last three months of 2008. ... But it is the Merrill deal that raises the most troubling questions. Evaluating the policy of Messrs. Bernanke and Paulson on their own terms, this transaction fundamentally increased systemic risk. In order to save a Wall Street brokerage, the feds spread the risk to one of the country's largest deposit-taking banks. ... Instead they transplanted the Merrill risk to BofA shareholders, the bank's depositors and the taxpayers who ensure those deposits. And then they had to bail out BofA too. ... Mr. Paulson told Mr. Cuomo's investigators that he also kept former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox out of the loop while forcing BofA to rescue Merrill. ... At the next meeting on January 8, a week after the merger had closed, the minutes again make no mention of either regulator telling their colleauges that they had committed tens of billions of dollars. Yet the minutes helpfully note that among the topics discussed were 'coordination, transparency and oversight'," my emphasis, Editorial at the WSJ, 27 April 2009. […]

Via:  naked capitalism

New Allegations Of White House Threats Over Chrysler Clusterstock (hat tip reader Bruce). Wall Street has gotten so piggy that up to a point, I'm not bothered by a show of force back. Without having a bit more detail, it's hard to know whether Team Obama stepped over the line. Remember, J, Edgar Hoover supposedly had dossiers on everyone who counted in America (recall the public had more privacy than it has now), and Nixon had an enemies' list. DC is more thuggish than we like to believe.

New Allegations Of White House Threats Over Chrysler

John Carney|May. 5, 2009, 12:33 PM|comment153

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Tags: Economy, Chrysler, White House, Barack Obama, Politics, Hedge Funds, Bankruptcy, Bailout, U.S. Government, Treasury

Creditors to Chrysler describe negotiations with the company and the Obama administration as "a farce," saying the administration was bent on forcing their hands using hardball tactics and threats.

Conversations with administration officials left them expecting that they would be politically targeted, two participants in the negotiations said.

Although the focus has so been on allegations that the White House threatened Perella Weinberg, sources familiar with the matter say that other firms felt they were threatened as well. None of the sources would agree to speak except on the condition of anonymity, citing fear of political repercussions.

The sources, who represent creditors to Chrysler, say they were taken aback by the hardball tactics that the Obama administration employed to cajole them into acquiescing to plans to restructure Chrysler. One person described the administration as the most shocking "end justifies the means" group they have ever encountered.  Another characterized Obama was "the most dangerous smooth talker on the planet- and I knew Kissinger." Both were voters for Obama in the last election.

One participant in negotiations said that the administration's tactic was to present what one described as a  "madman theory of the presidency" in which the President is someone to be feared because he was willing to do anything to get his way. The person said this threat was taken very seriously by his firm.

The White House has denied the allegation that it threatened Perella Weinberg.

Last week Obama singled out the firms that continue to oppose his plan for Chrysler, saying he would not stand with them. Perella Weinberg says it was convinced to support the plan by this stark drawing of a line between firms that have the president's backing and those that did not. They didn't want to be on the wrong side of Obama. Privately, administration officials have expressed confidence that other firms will switch sides for this reason.

These allegations add to the picture of an administration willing to use intimidation to win over support for its Chrysler plans--and then categorically deny it.

Tuesday, May 5, 2009

Graph to contemplate

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These are 3-year moving average growth rates.  If M2 (blue) and federal expenditures (green) take off, will inflation (black) be far behind?  The question is whether the downdraft of debt deflation and unemployment will offset money creation.  Both monetary and fiscal policy dials are set to maximum gain, but households are deleveraging and saving more, so debt-financed consumption is now negative, and there are 20 million inflation fighters out there helping Ben out.  It will take a while to get an inflation going.

Monday, May 4, 2009

Outrage deficit

Spring has sprung, the “animal spirits” are improving, and I just read an inspiring piece over at newdeal20.org by a minister recounting how social security got started, so I am deficient on the shrillness scale this morning:

In 1934, a retired dentist from California named Francis Townsend wrote a letter to the editor of his local paper. He was 66 years old, unemployed and without any savings. His plan was simple: Every citizen over age 60 would receive a check from the government for $200, to be paid for by a 2% sales tax. Jonathan Alter writes that, “Within a year, five thousand ‘Townsend Clubs’ across the country represented between 2 and 5 million members – a powerful new elderly lobby poised to take Congress by storm.”

Inside the administration, Frances Perkins, FDR’s Secretary of Labor and the first woman to be appointed to the U.S. Cabinet, immediately began to advocate for a kind of “social insurance” for the elderly. During FDR’s first year in office, she made more than 100 speeches building support for the idea across the country and brought it up at almost every meeting of the Cabinet.

Poverty rates were already high among the elderly but skyrocketed during the Great Depression, with an estimated unemployment rate for those over 65 at well above 50%. Stories of the old and poor dying alone or starving to feed their grandchildren began to grow. In the midst of crisis, our country made a decision of a distinctly moral nature that the failure of the market to provide for our oldest citizens should no longer be tolerated. It was this moral decision that eventually created one of the key building blocks of FDR’s New Deal, Social Security.

There is no evidence that the New York-Washington D.C. power elite are loosening their grip on the country, or will do so, ever (as Yves and other prominent bloggers keep reminding us) or that the future for much of the baby boom will be more than what passes today for subsistence (I like to joke that I’ll be retiring to a double-wide in the desert in one of FEMA’s “retirement villages”).  The elite with their sticky fingers and unrelenting greed will drive us toward the crisis Strauss and Howe predict (see Onward to Ekpyrosis, Death and Rebirth of American...).  There may not be an external enemy credible enough to launch a “world war” (Iraq didn’t work out that way, despite the theatrics, and Russia is still basically a bunch of drunks).  So I’d guess we’ll have something more like a revolution or break-up fomented by the immiseration of the mass of Americans next time, an alternation back to a domestic crisis like the one before the last one, the Civil War.  But it will take us a about decade to get there, if the saeculum runs true to form.

The economics mainstream is studiously ignoring the powerful theory of “animal spirits” of the obscure economist that I’ve dug up and tried to resuscitate, even as the model once again appears poised to beat the consensus forecast… so that the stimulus will be piled upon an organic expansion, just like everyone thought was the problem with fiscal policy… before the Panic of 2008 distorted their thinking.

Sufficient unto the day….

Sunday, May 3, 2009

Credit market distortions, courtesy of your government(s)

WARNING:  what follows is not investment advice, but research.  Trade at your own risk.

As I’ve written (‘Animal spirits’ update, April 3, 2009), I think there’s an arbitrage to be made going long Baa’s and short Treasuries, maturity matched.  As “animal spirits” recover, risk premia of the normal out-on-the-curve variety will decrease.

The liquidity being force-fed into the system, meanwhile, is distorting (blowing away) risk-premia at the short end. 

Via: Contrary Investor

Maybe more than any other headline credit market indicator of the moment we believe Fed actions have distorted what used to be the prior “risk based” message of LIBOR.  And that cuts right to the conceptual heart of government intervention.  Just how the heck can the private sector assess risk and allocate capital correctly and efficiently when the Fed/Treasury/Administration is acting to help “misprice” assets and risk measures?  In our eyes, there will be no true recovery in the economy and capital markets until risk is being priced appropriately and all risks are known (the issue of transparency).  Make no mistake about it, the decline in LIBOR is not a result of credit market healing and the lessening of risk perceptions.  It’s a result of the Fed TAF.  And so once again, how do they step away from this intervention?

Read entire piece here:  http://www.contraryinvestor.com/mo.htm